WASHINGTON (AP) – An internal report from U.S. Capitol police describes a host of missteps that left the force unprepared for the Jan. 6 insurgency. – riot shields that were broken on impact, expired weapons that could not be used, inadequate training and a division of intelligence that had few established standards.
The watchdog report released internally last month, obtained by The Associated Press ahead of a congressional hearing Thursday, adds to what is already known about the broader security and intelligence failures Congress is investigating. since hundreds of supporters of President Donald Trump besieged the Capitol.
In a comprehensive and detailed schedule for that day, the report describes the talks between officials because they disagreed on whether National Guard forces were needed to support the Capitol Police force with little staff. An army officer was quoted as telling Capitol police chief Steven Sund that “we don’t like the National Guard’s optics to be in line at the Capitol” after the insurgents had already broken into.
Inspector General Michael A. Bolton found that the department’s shortcomings were – and continue to be – widespread. The equipment was old and poorly stored, the leaders had not been able to act according to previous recommendations to improve intelligence and there was a great lack of current policies or procedures for the Civil Disruption Unit, a division that existed to ensure that the legislative functions of Congress were not interrupted. for civil unrest or protest activities. That was exactly what happened on January 6, when Trump supporters tried to cancel the election in his favor while Congress had the votes of the Electoral College..
The report comes as the Capitol police force has fallen into disrepair and approached the crisis as many officers have been working in additional shifts and forcing overtime to protect the Capitol after the insurrection. Acting leader Yogananda Pittman received a vote of no-confidence from the union in February, reflecting widespread distrust among members of the base.
All force is also grieving the deaths of two of its own: Officer Brian Sicknick, who collapsed and died after associating with protesters on January 6, and Officer William “Billy” Evans, who was killed on April 2 when he was hit by a car that crashed into a barricade outside the Senate. Evans was honored at the Capitol Roundabout on Tuesday.
Capitol Police have so far refused to release the report publicly, marked as “sensitive to law enforcement,” despite pressure from Congress to do so. House Board of Directors Chair Zoe Lofgren, D-California, issued a statement in March informing her of the report, along with another internal document, that contained “detailed and disturbing conclusions and recommendations. important ”. testify in court Thursday.
The report focuses heavily on equipment and training failure on Jan. 6, as Capitol Police were quickly overwhelmed by some 800 Trump supporters who passed them in front of them. knocked and broke windows and doors to enter the building. It also analyzes lost intelligence, as insurgents planned the attack openly online and how various agencies sent warnings that were spread incorrectly.
Bolton found that in many cases the department teams had expired, but they were not replaced and some were over 20 years old. Bolton found that the riot shields that were broken on impact when officers defended themselves from the violent mob had been improperly stored. Some weapons that could have fired tear gas were so old that officers did not feel comfortable with them. Other weapons that could have done more to disperse the crowd were never staged before the rally, and those who were ordered to obtain backup supplies from front-line officers were unable to reach the aggressive crowd. .
In other cases, weapons were not used by “leadership orders,” the report says. These weapons, called “less lethal” because they are designed to disperse, not kill, could have allowed police to better push riot police as they headed toward the building, according to the report.
As for the Civil Disruption Unit, the report said there was a total lack of policy and procedure, and that many officers did not want to be part of it. There were not enough guidelines on when to activate the unit, how to issue equipment, what tactics to use, or setting the command structure. Some of the policies had not been updated for more than a decade and there was no firm list of who was even in the division. The unit was at a “decreased level of readiness and readiness” because there were no equipment standards, according to the report.
Bolton also exposed many of the lost intelligence signals, including a report prepared by the Department of Homeland Security in December that forwarded messages posted on forums in support of Trump that appeared to be planned for January 6th. Part of this document included a map of the Capitol tunnels that someone had published. “Take note,” the message said.
The report analyzes a lost note from the FBI in which online activists predicted a “war” on January 6th. Sund told Senate investigators last month that he never saw her. Bolton also details internal reports of the force, which he said were inconsistent. A Capitol police report predicted that protesters could become violent, but Sund told the Senate in February that internal assessments had said the violence was “unlikely.”
As for intelligence, Bolton said, there was a lack of proper training and guidance for dissemination in the department. There were no policies or procedures for collecting open source data, such as gathering information from Trump’s online forums, and analysts “may not be aware of the proper methods for conducting intelligence work. open source “.
A chronology attached to the report gives a more detailed view of the movements, commands, and conversations of the Capitol Police as the day unfolded and they hurried to move personnel and equipment to various fronts where people were being introduced.
The chronology sheds new light on the conversations in which Sund called for support from the National Guard. Sund and others, including the head of the DC National Guard, have stated that Pentagon officials were concerned about the prospect of sending aid.
The document gives the clearest evidence of this concern to date, and cites Army Staff Secretary Walter Piatt, who told Sund and others who said “we don’t like the optics “from the National Guard to the Capitol and that I would recommend not sending them. It was 2:26 p.m., as the riots had already broken the windows and Sund desperately called for help.
The Pentagon finally approved the presence of the Guard and members of the Guard arrived after 5 p.m. While they waited, Sund also had a teleconference with Vice President Mike Pence, according to the chronology. Pence was in a safe place at the Capitol because he had overseen the counting of votes and some riot police called for his hanging because he had indicated he would not try to overturn President Joe Biden’s election victory.
The AP reported Saturday that Pence also held a conversation that day with Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller, in which he said “Clear the Capitol.”
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Associated Press writers Lisa Mascaro and Colleen Long contributed to this report.