Eventually, the Stadia Games and Entertainment teams got the software and people they needed to protect the Stadia games. The appeal of a Google-sized paycheck and a crisp-fuel hamster wheel exit ramp was enough to attract a critical mass of developers to Stadia Games and Entertainment. Artists, producers, audio experts, and programmers had been promoted with the promise of making unique games for revolutionary software and, many believed, without the threat of layoffs like the sword of Damocles, as is often the case. traditional gaming companies. Teams were exploring what Google games could look like, how to better harness the power of Google’s massive data centers, and show the games in the cloud. Then Covid-19 attacked.
In April 2020, a month after the announcement of the Los Angeles study, Google implemented a hiring freeze. “Now is the time to significantly slow down the pace of recruitment,” Pichai said in an internal message, “maintaining momentum in a small number of strategic areas where users and businesses rely on Google for ongoing support and where our growth is critical to its success “. According to four sources, the game was not one of those “strategic areas.”
“If the company was right putting us in a hiring freeze, it would also be good at damaging our ability to create content,” says one source. “The studio was not yet fully formed and ready to produce games. That put the brakes on and was a statement. We interpreted it as a lack of commitment on the part of Google to make content. “
Google is not the first technology giant to encounter these difficulties. Amazon followed a similar arc. In 2020, ONLINE investigated the enormous challenges Jeff Bezos ’empire has faced in producing first-hand games at its Amazon Game Studios. Like Google, Amazon hired the best of the best: trusted developers like Far Cry 2Clint Hocking, Shock System 2Ian Vogel, EverQuestJohn Smedley, i PortalKim Swift, many of whom were excited about the stability and relatively higher salaries associated with the tech giant. Amazon’s goal, according to several sources, was to make a $ 1 billion franchise that would help advertise the company’s cloud technology, proprietary game engine, and Twitch streaming service.
According to sources, the approach was hubristic. Amazon wanted to “win in games,” simultaneously developing several AAA games despite its non-existent history in the industry. The head of Amazon Game Studios, Mike Frazzini, has no previous professional experience in gaming. High expectations combined with Amazon’s idiosyncrasy, for example, an obsession with internal software, and a fixation on measuring success with data, have led to failure after failure. Amazon has canceled at least three of its games: Project Nova, Getaway, i Crucible, the last of which was canceled just five months after launch.
Developing AAA games can cost between $ 100 million and $ 200 million. Successes like Blizzard Overwatch come from the ashes of failures, such as the company’s massive online multiplayer role-playing game Tità. Product design at large technology companies may not always be straightforward, but game design is a maze that requires resources and money.
“I think it’s a lack of understanding of the process,” says a source who works at Stadia. “There seemed to be people at the executive level who didn’t quite understand how to navigate a highly creative and transversal space.”
During the freezing of Google’s hiring, game developers felt frustrated in achieving their goals. Prototypes were developed without complete resources; the studies did not work at full capacity. When it came time to review performance, according to three sources, Google judged game developers against benchmarks created for visual or UX designers. There are no numbers associated with “fun to play” or a process-based workflow to generate creativity. Veteran game developers put a lot of pressure on their work culture. Over time, Google seemed to soften. The developers got the tools they needed, the right review processes. But not the cash. The frustration persisted.