Sallegedly outhwest Airlines endangered the safety of thousands of flights by forcing its pilots to fly beyond the safety limits recommended by Boeing to operate the airline’s fleet of 737 aircraft.
This accusation is found in a new report by a Senate committee as part of a scathing indictment of overseeing the safety of passengers on U.S. airlines by the Federal Aviation Administration. The committee is chaired by Republican Sen. Roger Wicker of Mississippi.
Serious security concerns about Southwest’s operating methods originated in a whistleblower, a veteran former naval pilot, Jeffrey Rees, who was one of the FAA’s security inspectors at the Texas airline base.
Rees, who agreed to be identified in the report, says Southwest introduced changes to a computerized system that determines whether or not a plane is safe to get out of the door that were “incredibly dangerous.”
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Rees focused on a program, Performance Weight and Balance System, PWB, that is part of a critical checklist before takeoff, which Southwest introduced in 2017.
All airlines use a similar system to achieve optimal efficiency for each flight: balancing the amount of fuel needed, the amount of cargo that can be transported, the distribution of passenger cargo, along with the specific conditions in the airport at departure: weather, wind direction, air temperature, runway length and airport altitude above sea level.
The result of these calculations is intended to provide sufficient safety margins so that pilots can feel confident that, whatever the conditions, there is no risk.
Rees claims that Southwest removed the previous “security buffers” and in doing so significantly reduced the margins of error.
In surprising detail, the report cites cases in which pilots had difficulty transporting the aircraft and, during take-off, had to “aggressively use electronic cut-off switches” to get off the runway and, in doing so, -they exceeded the limits recommended by Boeing for safe handling.
This meant that the nose of the plane was tilted to a point where it would be about to induce an aerodynamic stop, which at this height would end up with the plane crashing.
A Southwest pilot is quoted as saying: “I can tell you without reservation that PWB has been an impediment for me to fly a 737 from A to B safely.”
One of the main reasons for reducing the safety margin, according to the report, is that Southwest wanted to increase the amount of cargo on each flight. The “belly load” (load that goes to the cellar) is a growing source of income.
Brandy King, a spokesman for the Southwest, told the Daily Beast: “Earlier this year we discovered a discrepancy between the data systems involving the weight of some aircraft. Southwest took immediate action to prevent a recurrence. , which included notification to the FAA, correction of data discrepancies, and launching a daily audit to review each of the affected systems.
“As a result, and with great caution, we stopped flying those planes for a short period of time to recalculate the weights of the plane and reset the program.”
In fact, the record shows that Southwest is a repeat offender in matters of safety, especially because of the quality of its maintenance.
In April 2011, a Southwest 737 with 118 passengers on board was reaching its 36,000-foot cruising altitude when an explosive error in the fuselage structure left a 50-centimeter-long hole in the roof. from the cabin. The pilots sent a call from Mayday – “we lost the cockpit” – and managed to make an emergency landing.
The aircraft involved was an older model of the 737, delivered in 1996 and prone to cracks in the skin of the fuselage caused by corrosion. Two years earlier, the FAA had received a $ 7.5 million fine from the FAA for failing to conduct inspections to detect cracks in aircraft that made nearly 6,000 flights.
The problem has persisted to this day: in March, a 737 Southwest landed emergency after a 12-inch-long crack appeared above the cockpit.
In 2017, FAA inspectors found “potentially serious gaps” in the maintenance of 88,737 antiques that Southwest bought after being used by other airlines. The Senate report is highly critical of the airline’s maintenance record on these aircraft, saying numerous repairs performed “did not meet airworthiness requirements.”
Now, the challenges facing pilots with the introduction of changes to the PCB system have added to the impression that the airline is regularly trimmed to look for benefits.
Last January, the FAA proposed a $ 3.92 million civil penalty after discovering that 21,505 flights were operated with an incorrect weight and balance configuration. Still, Rees warned Senate investigators that “non-compliance continues” and has worsened because the pilots had been “inadequately trained and prepared” for them.
Southwest was a pioneer in the budget airline business model that has been copied around the world. It is based on the use of one type of aircraft – in the case of successive southwestern models of the Boeing 737 – and get the most out of it, making up to seven flights a day with a rapid change in each airport.
This model has evolved in the southwest over four decades without any catastrophic accidents and, given the intensity of its schedules, the airline has an exemplary safety record that undoubtedly reflects the quality of its pilots.
However, as of 2017, Rees has been critical of the way the airline trains its pilots. He was particularly concerned about the implementation of new training standards required for 2019 that were enforced by the FAA following the 2009 crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 that killed all 49 people on board.
That crash exposed a problem that has been identified around the world: as cockpits become more and more automated, pilots have lost the “pants seat” skills that used to be basic when it came to ‘an emergency.
The FAA recommended that, for the new training program, airlines select a small group of their best pilots to refresh their own skills and then instruct the rest of the pilots. As a former pilot of the Navy’s “Top Gun,” Rees had a complete understanding of the problem because flying from an aircraft carrier requires sharp reflexes and a real sense of an aircraft’s behavior.
Rees told Senate researchers that he said at least 50 percent of southwest flight crews needed retraining, but instead of following the principle of creating a small core of instructor pilots, the South West assigned 400 pilots to speed up the process and that this “prevented proper quality control”.
Rees alleged that when he suggested to his FAA supervisor that a warning letter be sent to the Southwest that the training program was seriously flawed, the supervisor told another FAA inspector to write a “softer” letter. Southwest made no changes, he said.
In fact, the Senate committee report often presents an image of ambivalence in the way the FAA oversees security in the Southwest: problems are exposed, often only after they are endemic, civil sanctions are imposed , but continued FAA oversight on the ground is lax and tends to calm rather than confront.
Spokesman King said: “We absolutely do not agree with the allegations of undue influence made in the report. At no time did Southwest inhibit or interfere with the FAA’s ability to exercise oversight.”
Southwest’s nationwide route structure encompasses a wide variety of airports and changes in seasonal climates which in turn mean its pilots need to be familiar with many different and rapidly changing conditions. most critical phases of a flight, takeoff and landing. often in a day.
Reflecting on this, Rees alerted the Senate committee to the impact of changes in PWB rules on pilots flying in and out of airports with shorter runways, where the margin of error with a fully loaded 737 is reduced. He said some pilots had taken photographs showing the margin had become “low or non-existent”.
The Senate report says committee staff spoke with several pilots who confirmed Rees ’report and shared their concerns, but feared being fired if they spoke.